The largest part of the primate prefrontal cortex has no homolog in other mammals. Accordingly, it probably confers some advantage that other mammals either lack or attain through the function of other structures. Yet, this advantage remains enigmatic. This is not so for other parts of the cortex. For example, certain visual areas encode, represent and store knowledge about objects. By analogy, perhaps the primate prefrontal cortex encodes, represents and stores knowledge about behaviors, including the consequences of doing (or not doing) something in complex and challenging situations. The long list of functions often attributed to the prefrontal cortex could contribute to knowing what to do and what will happen when rare risks arise or outstanding opportunities knock.
'The earliest experiments on the frontal areas were those of the French neurologist Flourens (1824), who, on the basis of ablation studies. . .attributed to the frontal lobes, acting in harmony with the rest of the brain, the higher perceptual, associative, and executive functions of the mind.' [1,p447] Flourens got it right, in a way, yet, his experiment and conclusions had no validity whatsoever. He studied the effect of cerebral ablations on a hen, which had no frontal lobes, either before or after the lesion. Research on the frontal lobes, especially the prefrontal cortex, has always been like this, and every generation seems to reach conclusions much like those that Flourens advocated in 1824 (the year of Paul Broca's birth). The doctrine of the day seems intriguing and authorities announce the problem solved, or nearly so, for a while; then dissatisfaction develops and the cycle begins anew. When the puzzle of prefrontal cortex is finally solved, the account will inevitably seem familiar, even tired, if only because every possibility has probably been propounded.
Flourens' misconception underscores an important principle for understanding the prefrontal cortex: combining findings from different species requires a serious consideration of the relevant homologies. Here, I take up that topic first, and at heart it involves a fundamental question: what is the prefrontal cortex? The second topic concerns the distinction between cognitive processes and knowledge, and it involves a similarly fundamental question: what does the prefrontal cortex do? Grafman and colleagues [2] have noted that most ideas about prefrontal cortex function involve cognitive processes such as working memory, retrieval of long-term memories, top-down attention and so forth, rather than a particular kind of knowledge stored in long-term memory. This is a strange state of affairs. Other parts of the cerebral cortex encode, represent and store specialized kinds of knowledge, which can be used in several cognitive processes. For example, high-order visual areas such as the inferotemporal and perirhinal cortex store knowledge about objects [3-6]. When we ask 'what knowledge does the prefrontal cortex store?' an equally straightforward answer might emerge.
What is the prefrontal cortex?
Most knowledge about the prefrontal cortex comes from research on rodents, various kinds of monkeys (mainly macaques) and the peculiar primate that has spilled so much ink over its own prefrontal cortex. Synthesis of this knowledge should promote our understanding of the prefrontal cortex, but an important misconception often hampers this undertaking. Although rarely expressed as such, common opinion holds that the frontal cortex of rodents is a replica-in-miniature of the primate frontal cortex. Many experts assume, and some have forcefully argued [7] , that rodents have a homolog of the areas collectively called the 'granular' prefrontal cortex in monkeys, apes and humans. I find an alternative opinion to be more persuasive. It holds that primates -and primates alone -have evolved certain new areas and that these new areas dominate their frontal lobe (Figures 1 and 2) .
In a sense, this idea has been around for a long time, but Preuss [8, 9] first dealt with this issue convincingly by placing it in a contemporary, comparative perspective. In essence, Preuss concluded that rodents lack a 'granular' prefrontal cortex and have no areas that need to be called prefrontal. First published in 1995, his thesis has distressed neuroscientists who sometimes suppose that Preuss's perspective devalues or demeans rodent research. Although I understand that sentiment, there is no need to think of his conclusions that way. If rodents lack certain areas that appeared during primate evolution, they nevertheless share many important frontal areas that evolved earlier, in ancestors common to both rodents and primates (Figure 2b ). If some parts of the frontal lobe lie beyond the reach of rodent research, much nevertheless remains within its grasp [8, 10] . Finally, labeling the shared areas as 'prefrontal' does no harm when authors acknowledge additional, unshared areas in primates.
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